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The Supreme Court's Decision in Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell: The Demise of
Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress for Public Figures?
Introduction
In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,1 the United States Supreme
Court reversed a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision2 that
upheld an award of damages to the Rev. Jerry Falwell for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress from an ad parody.
The court of appeals held that Falwell could recover damages
for intentional infliction of emotional distress without prevail-
ing on his libel claim. The United States Supreme Court held
that "public figures and public officials may not recover for the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of
publications such as the one here at issue without showing, in
addition, that the publication contains a false statement of fact
which was made with 'actual malice,"' defined as "with knowl-
edge of such falsification or with reckless disregard for the
truth."5 This Comment explores the impact of the Supreme
Court's holding on future public figure plaintiffs who want to
assert an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
Part I of this Comment summarizes the facts of the lawsuit.
Part II analyzes the appellate court decision and Part III ana-
lyzes the Supreme Court decision. Finally, Part IV concludes
that courts should apply the actual malice standard to claims of
intentional infliction of emotional distress when a public figure
brings an independent cause of action.
1. 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988).
2. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Hustler Maga-
zine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 870 (1988).
3. Falwel, 797 F.2d at 1278.
4. Id. at 1276.
5. Hustler Magazine, 108 S. Ct. at 882. The actual malice standard enunciated in
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), provides that a public figure cannot
recover damages for a defamation unless he proves the statement was made with "ac-
tual malice," meaning "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not." Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1278.
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I
The Ad
In November 1983, Hustler magazine published a parody of
an advertisement for Campari Liqueur entitled "Jerry Falwell
Talks About his First Time."' The Campari advertisement be-
ing parodied consisted of interviews with celebrities about their
"first time" drinking Campari.7 The ads played on the sexual
connotation of "first time," intimating that the Campari ad
might be referring to the celebrity's first sexual encounter.'
Hustler used the exact form of the Campari ads and created an
"interview" with Falwell in which he stated that his "first
time" was with his mother in an outhouse while he was intoxi-
cated. The "interview" went as follows:
Falwell: My first time was in an outhouse outside Lynchburg,
Virginia.
Interviewer: Wasn't it a little cramped?
Falwell: Not after I kicked the goat out.
Interviewer: I see. You must tell me all about it.
Falwell: I never really expected to make it with Mom, but then
after she showed all the other guys in town such a good time, I
figured, "What the hell!"
Interviewer: But your Mom? Isn't that a bit odd?
Falwell: I don't think so. Looks don't mean that much to me in
a woman.
Interviewer: Go on.
Falwell: Well, we were drunk off our God-fearing asses on
Campari, ginger ale and soda-that's called a Fire and Brim-
stone-at the time. And Mom looked better than a Baptist
whore with a $100 donation.
Interviewer: Campari in the crapper with Mom... how inter-
esting. Well, how was it?
Falwell: The Campari was great, but Mom passed out before I
could come.
Interviewer: Did you ever try it again?
Falwell: Sure... lots of times. But not in the outhouse. Be-
tween Mom and the shit, the flies were too much to bear.
Interviewer: We meant the Campari.
Falwell: Oh yeah. I always get sloshed before going out to the
pulpit. You don't think I could lay down all that bullshit sober,




HUSTLER MAGAZINE V FALWELL
do you?9
The advertisement contained a disclaimer in small print at
the bottom of the page which stated, "ad parody-not to be
taken seriously."'1 The table of contents of the issue referred
to the ad as "Fiction; Ad and Personality Parody."11
Jerry Falwell sued Hustler publisher Larry Flynt and Flynt
Distributing Company in the District Court for the Western
District of Virginia alleging invasion of privacy, libel, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.12 The district court ruled
in favor of Hustler magazine, Larry Flynt, and Flynt Distribut-
ing Company [hereinafter collectively referred to as Flynt] on
the invasion of privacy claim.'3 The jury found for the petition-
ers on the defamation claim, stating that the ad parody could
not "reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about
[Falwell] or actual events in which [he] participated."'1 4 How-
ever, the jury awarded Falwell damages for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.
5
II
The Fourth Circuit Decision
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's holding.'6 Flynt made two arguments: 1) Falwell, as a
public figure, must meet the actual malice standard in New
York Times v. Sullivan " before recovering damages for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress; and 2) because the jury
did not find the ad reasonably believable, the statements con-
tained therein were opinion statements which were protected
by the first amendment.'8
After finding that the defendants were entitled to the same
level of protection when alleging intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress as they would receive in a libel claim, the court
held that the New York Times actual malice standard is not
9. HusTLER, Nov. 1983, at 2.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 3.




16. Falweil, 797 F.2d 1270, 1278 (4th Cr. 1986).
17. See supra note 5.
18. Falwell 797 F.2d at 1275-76.
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appropriate for this cause of action.'9 The court noted that re-
quiring a plaintiff to prove actual malice would add a new ele-
ment to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.20
Relying on this reasoning, the court held that when the first
amendment imposes the actual malice standard, the jury must
find only that the defendant's intentional and reckless miscon-
duct proximately caused the alleged injury.2 ' The court found
Flynt's assertion of protection for the opinion statement was
irrelevant to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, since the tort merely evaluates whether a publication is
sufficiently outrageous to constitute intentional infliction of
emotional distress.2
The court dismissed the argument that Falwell could not as-
sert a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress without prevailing on a libel claim. It reasoned that the
elements required to prove libel and intentional infliction of
emotional distress differ,2s and concluded that evidence of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress was sufficient to sus-
tain the jury's verdict against Flynt.24
The Fourth Circuit decision received much criticism,
25 and
some courts chose not to follow it.' In Falwell v. Flynt: An
Emerging Threat to Freedom of Speech,27 the author refers to
the decision as "shallow and unconvincing," as well as "clearly
wrong. ' The author argues that the same actual malice stan-
19. Id. at 1275.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1276.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1277.
25. See, e.g., Note, Falwell v. Flynt: An Emerging Threat to Freedom of Speech,
1987 UTAH L. REv. 703 (1987).
26. See Blatty v. New York Times Co., 42 Cal. 3d 1033, 1047-48, 232 Cal. Rptr. 542,
728 P.2d 1177 (1986), where the California Supreme Court stated.
Under the Supremacy Clause a state's definition of a tort cannot undermine
the requirements of the First Amendment. That is precisely the teaching of
New York Times. In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that
the First Amendment required the plaintiff to establish falsity, 376 U.S. at
280, even though state law did not require him to do so. Id. at 262. Indeed, in
that case the court effectively held that the First Amendment abrogated the
common law of strict liability, added the element of falsity, and thereby al-
tered the nature of the tort. The Falwell court misses this crucial point and
as a result cannot be followed.
Blattij, 42 Cal. 3d at 1048, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 551, 728 P.2d at 1186.
27. Note, supra note 25.
28. Id. at 719.
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dard should be applied to media defendants whether the tort is
intentional infliction of emotional distress or defamation.'
Otherwise, the first amendment protections afforded publish-
ers by the New York Times actual malice standard could well
be eroded.
III
The Supreme Court Decision
The United States Supreme Court's decision added a new and
perhaps surprising twist to tort law. The Court held that
Falwell could not assert a cause of action for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress from the Hustler ad parody without
prevailing on a claim of defamation or other primary cause of
action.s° This decision effectively shields the media from suits
alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress absent other
claims.
The Supreme Court explained that the issue in the case was
"whether a public figure may recover damages for emotional
harm caused by the publication of an ad parody offensive to
him. '131 Falwell claimed that, regardless of whether or not
speech about a public figure could reasonably be interpreted as
stating actual facts, the state's interest in protecting public
figures from emotional distress caused by offensive speech is
sufficient to deny first amendment protection.s2 Not only did
the Supreme Court reject Falwell's view, but it significantly
limited the applicability of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress to public figure plaintiffs.
Relying on the importance of the first amendment to en-
courage "the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of pub-
lic interest and concern,"' the Court recognized that this
"robust political debate" could subject public figures to "vehe-
ment, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks."m
The Court reasoned that the first amendment prohibits a
"bad motive" from being the basis of tort liability for public de-
29. Id. at 727.
30. Hustler Magazine, 108 S. Ct. at 882.




35. Id. at 880 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
19881 1167
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.
bate about public figures.s6 To hold otherwise would subject
cartoonists and satirists to damage awards in the absence of a
showing that their work falsely defamed anyone. The Court
considered the "prominent role in public and political debate"
of satirical cartoons throughout history, and found that "it is
clear that our political discourse would have been considerably
poorer without them.""
The Court rejected the outrageousness standard as having
"an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury
to impose liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or
perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expres-
sion."3 9 The Court concluded that "public figures and public
officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one
here at issue without showing in addition that the publication
contains a false statement of fact which was made with 'actual
malice,' i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or
with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true."'
IV
"Actual Malice" as a Better Standard
The Supreme Court's holding in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell
is deceptive. In reversing the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
the Supreme Court does not clearly reach the opposite view-
point that a public figure plaintiff can never state a cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the ab-
sence of an underlying claim such as defamation. Rather, the
Court leaves this issue open.41 By limiting its holding to publi-
cations similar to the one involved in this case, the Court has
ceased groping for a clear objective standard, and instead has
given us an unclear subjective test which will have to be ap-
plied and developed on a case-by-case basis.
The Supreme Court opinion could be interpreted in at least
two ways: 1) as precluding a public figure plaintiff from assert-
ing a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress without prevailing on a claim for defamation; or 2) as
36. Hustler Magazine, 108 S. Ct. at 881.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 882.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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holding that Falwell or the Hustler ad parody itself did not
meet the requirements necessary to assert an independent
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The lan-
guage, "publications such as the one here at issue, '42 qualifies
and limits the Court's holding, thus supporting the latter view.
The Supreme Court's rationale supports the application of an
"actual malice" standard when public figures assert an in-
dependent cause of action for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.
The Supreme Court based its decision primarily on the im-
portance of encouraging the free flow of ideas and opinions and
"robust political debate.143 In the area of defamation of public
figures, the Court has protected first amendment rights by im-
posing the New York Times actual malice standard.44 In Hus-
tler Magazine v. Falwell, the Court rejected the outrageousness
standard to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress as
too subjective to afford the requisite first amendment protec-
tion media defendants should receive in their comments about
public figures.4 The Court's concern with the outrageousness
standard would be resolved if the Court applied the New York
Times actual malice standard to public figures alleging inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.
46
The Supreme Court decided the case without clearly stating
whether intentional infliction of emotional distress can be as-
serted as an independent cause of action. Nor did the Court
state what standard would apply to a public figure plaintiff at-
tempting to state intentional infliction of emotional distress as
42. Id.
43. Id. at 879.
44. New York Times, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
45. Hustler Magazine, 108 S. Ct. at 880-81.
46. However, one study has analyzed cases in which plaintiffs alleged intentional
infliction of emotional distress as an independent cause of action. "Given the de-
mands of the 'outrageousness' requirement, it is not surprising that few cases have
reached the questions of either the defendant's fault or the severity of the emotional
harm." Drechsel, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: New Tort Liability
for Mass Media, 89 Dicv. L. REv. 339, 348 (1985). Later in his note, while comparing
libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress he states, "[b]ut the high barriers
of fault, outrageousness and severe harm requirements may well provide a more pow-
erful defense to intentional infliction suits than anything other than an absolutist in-
terpretation of the First Amendment ever could." Id. at 352. Even if Drechsel's study
is wrong and the Supreme Court is correct in its assertion that 'outrageousness' is too
easy a standard for public figure plaintiffs asserting emotional distress claims, the
Supreme Court's concerns enunciated in Hustler Magazine, would be resolved if the
Court applied the New York Times actual malice standard.
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an independent cause of action. In denying Falwell's claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Supreme Court
has given the media a license to inflict emotional distress on
public figure plaintiffs intentionally as long as they carefully
tailor the language so that it is not defamatory.47
A person who thrusts herself into the public arena should get
at least as much protection against intentional infliction of
emotional distress as she receives against defamation. The
Supreme Court's opinion is logically inconsistent because it
does not explain why the state's interest in compensating
Falwell for emotional distress is greater when he prevails on
his libel claim than when he asserts emotional distress in-
dependent of a libel claim.
Arguably, expanding the tort of emotional distress might
give "plaintiffs a sort of 'trump card' "which would allow them
to circumvent defenses to defamation or privacy claims." How-
ever, this potential problem would be solved if the same de-
fenses to defamation of a public figure plaintiff apply to a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Similarly, a
plaintiff who states intentional infliction of emotional distress
as an independent cause of action and also prevails on another
cause of action which includes damages for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress should only collect damages for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress once (either in
combination with another claim or as an independent cause of
action). Because the same standard would apply for defama-
tion and for intentional infliction of emotional distress involv-
ing public figures, the chances of a plaintiff circumventing
these defenses would be slim.
The solution proposed in this Comment would solve the al-
leged subjectivity problem in the outragousness standard for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, while striking a
proper balance by both giving public figures the protection they
deserve from intentional infliction of emotional distress and
protecting the media from increased and frivolous lawsuits.
47. Drechsel explains that "[d]uring the past half-dozen years, libel and privacy
plaintiffs have begun attaching independent claims for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress to their suits against media defendants." Id. at 339. He analyzes these
cases, and shows that the courts have increasingly allowed plaintiffs to use intentional
infliction of emotional distress as an independent cause of action. Id. at 339-44, 34-50,
355-58.
48. Mead, Suing Media for Emotional Distress; A Multi-Method Analysis qf Tort
Law Evolution, 23 WASHBURN LJ. 24 (1983).
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Applying the New York Times actual malice standard to public
figures alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress will
not open the floodgates to increased intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims because the burden of proof is greater
when a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is
independently asserted.49 Because a public figure plaintiff may
plead intentional infliction of emotional distress as an in-
dependent cause of action or in conjunction with another tort,
if a plaintiff chooses to plead intentional infliction of emotional
distress as an independent cause of action, he or she will be
held to a higher standard.
Under this proposal, a public figure plaintiff asserting an in-
dependent cause of action for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress would have to meet the New York Times actual
malice standard. However, a public figure plaintiff asserting a
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress as
a result of another tort (e.g., defamation) would merely have to
meet the outrageousness standard for the emotional distress
claim. The reasoning behind the difference in standards is that
when the two torts are alleged together, the burden of proof of
the primary tort (defamation) is high enough to preserve media
defendants' first amendment rights and shield them from frivo-
lous lawsuits.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court has left public figure plaintiffs in a poor
position with respect to the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. Not only will the lower courts have to resolve
on a case-by-case basis whether public figure plaintiffs can as-
sert a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress against media defendants, but they will also have to
determine whether or not these plaintiffs will be held to a
higher standard of proof than the cause of action normally de-
mands. Thus, lower courts should interpret the Supreme
Court's opinion in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell as leaving the
issue of whether a public figure plaintiff can assert a cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress open, and
they should adopt the actual malice standard when public fig-
49. PROSSER & KEETON ON ToRTS 60 (th ed. 1984).
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ure plaintiffs assert an independent cause of action for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.
Hollie Thier
